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HOW AN AMERICAN BSE CRISIS HAS AFFECTED THE VALUE OF
TRACEABILITY AND COUNTRY-OF-ORIGIN CERTIFICATIONS
IN THE U.S. BEEF INDUSTRY?
Ruby Ward, DeeVon Bailey, and Robert K. Jensen

ABSTRACT

The announcement on December 23, 2003 that a dairy cow in the state of Washington
was diagnosed as having ESE sent shock waves through the US beef industry. This research
uses auction experiments to determine the pre- and post-ESE effects of traceability and countryof-origin information on US consumer willingness to accept US and Canadian beef. The
findings indicate that ESE has likely damaged US consumer demand for Canadian beef more
than it has for US beef. The findings also indicate that most participants in the auction
experiments would support the implementation of a mandatory animal identification program in
the United States.
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HOW AN AMERICAN BSE CRISIS HAS AFFECTED THE VALUE OF
TRACEABILITY AND COUNTRY-PF-ORIGIN CERTIFICATIONS
IN THE U.S. BEEF INDUSTRy?1

Introduction

The announcement on December 23,2003 that a dairy cow in the state of Washington
had been diagnosed with Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE or Mad-Cow Disease) was a
watershed event for US livestock markets. Although US consumer demand for beef appeared to
remain strong in the weeks following the event, US beef industry and US government recognized
the need to move rapidly forward with plans to implement some type of traceability in US
livestock systems.
Traceability is a critical element for dealing with BSE. 2 Although traceability cannot
prevent the disease, once BSE is detected traceability is essential for tracking the source of the
disease. Traditional inspection systems focus on eliminating pathogens in the food marketing
chain, mostly at the processor and food preparation levels of the chain. Because BSE is thought
to originate with contaminated farm-level inputs (feed), the farms where an infected animal has
been must be identified together with any partner animals on those farms that may have also
been infected through the same feed source. Animal identification (ill) is essential for tracking
these movements.

ISpecial thanks are given to David L. Dickinson for helpful comments on an earlier version of the
manuscript and guidance in establishing protocols for the auction experiments. Thanks are also given to the Utah
Agricultural Experiment Station and a National Research Initiative grant provided by USDA, CSREES for providing
partial fmancial support for this research.
2 Traceability is also essential for dealing with other animal disease control and eradication issues,
addressing bio-terrorism concerns in the food chain, and narrowing the focus (limiting) of food recalls.
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Support for the US Animal Identification Plan (USAIP), a plan suggested as a blueprint
for implementing animal identification (ill) in the US by the summer of2005, began to build
following the discovery of BSE in Canada (Alberta) in May 2003 and became quite general
among US livestock producer groups after December 2003 (e.g., Breckendorf (2004); Lyon
(2004); Denis (2004); Philippi (2004); and Smith (2004)). The apparently high level of support
now enjoyed by the USAIP belies much of the discussion prior to May 2003 surrounding the
possible implementation of traceability systems in the US meat system. Prior to 2003, these
discussions centered on market solutions to the traceability issue and specifically the ability of
firms to recapture costs incurred in implementing the systems, specifically if consumers were
willingness to pay (WTP) for these additional costs through paying premiums for traceable meat
products, and also how benefits and costs of traceability would be shared in the marketing chain
(e.g., Wiemers (2001); Buhr (2002); Sparks (2002); Dickinson and Bailey (2002); Dickinson and
Bailey (2003); and Bailey, Jones, and Dickinson (2002)). Although public discussion in the US
since December 2003 has shifted somewhat away from proprietary interests such as WTP to now
focus on public goods (e.g., animal disease control and eradication and bioterrorism), consumer
acceptance of beef products and certifications made to consumers about beef products in light of

BSE remain important issues.
US livestock systems have lagged principal competitors and customers in the
development of livestock traceability systems (Lewis (2001); Liddell and Bailey (2001); Bailey
and Dickinson (2002)). For example, Canada implemented a mandatory cattle identification plan
in the summer of2002 with oversight by the Canadian Cattle Identification Agency (CCIA) (see
http://vv\,vvv.canadaid.comL). The European Union, Japan, Australia, New Zealand, and Uruguay
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have either implemented animal traceability systems or are actively engaged in doing so (Baines
and Davies (1998) and (2000); Lewis (2001); Liddell and Bailey (2001)).
Canada is an important case study for the US beef industry in relation to BSE because the
US and Canadian beef systems are quite similar and because the US and Canada have
traditionally competed in the same markets. Prior to May 2003, Canadian live cattle imports into
the US accounted for as much as 8% of total US cattle slaughter but this was reduced to zero
virtually overnight following the BSE case in Alberta. The CCIA's system provided valuable
assistance in tracking the infected animal's movements, but Canada's borders remained closed to
cattle and beef exporting to the US. 3 Given that a traceability system was in place in Canada
before the discovery of BSE there, one could ask if the Canadian traceability system should have
been taken into account before the US made a decision to close the Canadian border to cattle and
beef imports. Although legitimate animal health reasons may exist for border closures, did the
discovery of BSE in Canada in May 2003 significantly impact US consumer demand for
Canadian beef? The same question could be asked about foreign consumer demand for US beef
exports following the December 2003 event.
The purpose of this paper is to determine if traceability system can help preserve
consumer demand following the discovery of BSE. We focus specifically on the US and
examine whether consumer willingness to accept (WTA) non-traceable beef either imported
from Canada or produced domestically changed following the US BSE case in December 2003.
The question is whether or not traceability and country-or-origin information have
become more valuable to American consumers since December 2003. This is an important issue
because it has implications not only for beef markets but also for public policy. For example, as

3

(2004)).

Boneless Canadian beef from animals less than 30 months of age resumed in September 2003 (Robb
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the US government and US meat industry move toward implementing the US AlP , the issue of
who should pay for the system has become an important (Farm Foundation (2004)). This study
presents results from two sets of auction experiments examining US consumer WT A nontraceable beef from the US and Canada both before the US BSE case in December 2003 and after
the US BSE announcement. The data allow for this comparison because one set of the auction
experiments was serendipitously completed just prior to the December 2003 US BSE case and
the other set of auction experiments was completed in January 2004.
Past Work

A substantial body of literature has examined how consumers value information about
food products. The foundation for much of this work was laid by research that established the
value of labeling products for attributes such as food safety (e.g., Caswell (1998); and Caswell
and Padberg (1992); Huffman et al. (2003a)). This work suggested that consumer choices are
influenced by the information provided by food labels.
Other research has focused on the value of information on individual characteristics that
could either be placed on labels or communicated to consumers in other ways.4 Recently a
substantial body of research has focused on consumer acceptance of and government policy
towards genetically modified organisms (GMOs) in food products (e.g., Rousu et al. (2004);
Lusk, Roosen, and Fox (2003); Lusk and Fox (2002); Huffman et al. (2003a) and (2003b); and
Caswell (2000)). Other studies have examined the possibility of adding value to commodity or
food products by providing consumers information on a myriad of different single or bundled
characteristics including certifying enhanced food safety, the processes used to produce food, the

40 ther methods of communications could include advertising, point of sale materials, etc.
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location where food was produced, or the certifying agency (e.g., Loureiro (2003); Loureiro and
Umberger (2003); Dickinson and Bailey (2003); Dickinson and Bailey (2002)).
Traceability is a unique form of information for a food product because it provides
information as a single characteristic (e.g., provides the potential of legal recourse) but also is
used as a method to verify other product characteristics (e.g., enhanced food safety, humane
animal treatment, environmental responsibility, social responsibility, etc.). A few studies have
addressed the issue of traceability directly and have found traceability to be a valuable
characteristic in food products (e.g., Hobbs (1996a) and (1996b); Dickinson and Bailey (2002)
and (2003); and Buhr (2002)).
While the studies mentioned above used various methods, they generally support the
notion that information, including traceability, is valuable to consumers and other members of
the marketing chain, they also indicate that many consumers express a willingness to pay for this
additional information. The uniqueness of the problem addressed in this paper is that we
examine consumer attitudes about traceability immediately preceding and immediately following
a major food safety event (the American BSE case in December 2003). The data also help
address a major policy question about whether or not American consumers are willing to pay for
implementing an animal traceability system. Although traceability is a fundamental component
of any livestock system attempting to deal with BSE, it is costly to implement (USAIP (2004);
Sparks (2002); and Buhr (2002)). Consequently, measuring consumer attitudes about
traceability can gauge political support for these systems and how costs for implementing the
systems might be shared by the public and private sectors.
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Methods and Data
We focus specifically on US consumers and examine whether consumer WTA nontraceable beef, either imported from Canada or produced domestically, changed following the
US BSE case. This approach was selected assuming that traceability will eventually be the
imposed baseline standard in both the US and Canada and that WT A would measure what
consumers would need to be paid to go back to the old, non-traceable system.
Economic Experiments

Auction experiments were employed to measure US participants' WTA for non-traceable
US beef and traceable and non-traceable Canadian beef. Auction experiments have been used to
elicit willingness to pay (WTP) and WTA food product characteristics when publicly available
data were not available or were prohibitively costly to gather (e.g., Huffman et al. (2003a) and
(2003b); Dickinson and Bailey (2003) and (2002); Shogren, List, and Hayes (2000); Shogren et
al. (1994a) and (1994b)).
We follow basically the same design proposed by Shogren et al. (1994a) and used by
Dickinson and Bailey (2002) and (2003). However, rather than eliciting bids from participants to
"upgrade" a sandwich from a baseline to a different sandwich with enhanced characteristics, we
provided participants with a baseline traceable US beef sandwich and then elicited their WT A an
alternative sandwich that was non-traceable and/or consisted of imported Canadian beef. This
WTA represents the discount in price necessary to entice the participant to accept what they
perceive to be an inferior product compared to the baseline.
Subjects were recruited from four different demographic groups at Utah State University
in Logan, Utah USA. These cohorts included faculty members, students, professional employees
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(non-faculty employees in professional positions such as accounting, human resource
management, etc.), and classified employees (groundskeepers, food service workers, staff
assistants, etc.). Subjects were recruited by announcements in class (students) and by email and
announcement flyers that were distributed around campus. Four different experiments were held
(one each for each cohort) with approximately 13-14 participants in each experiment.
Experiments were conducted with individuals of similar socioeconomic characteristics (cohorts)
in each individual experiment to lower the potential influence of socioeconomic status barriers
within the group and to isolate the potential influence of socioeconomic characteristics on
bidding behavior (Dickinson and Bailey (2002)).
The first set of four experiments was held during the first week of December 2003 (preBSE). A second set of four experiments was held during the last week of January 2004 (postBSE). The pre-BSE experiments were originally conducted to determine if providing certifying

traceability in Canadian beef would make it more acceptable to American participants after the
Canadian BSE case in May 2003. The US BSE case was announced on December 23, 2003,
almost immediately after the first set of experiments had been conducted. Obviously, the
December 23 rd announcement changed the market landscape for beef in the US. This was the
motivation for conducting the post-BSE experiments in January 2004. As a result, quite by
accident, a data set was developed that measured US participants' WT A almost immediately
prior to the American BSE case and almost immediately thereafter.
The steps followed in both the pre- and post-BSE sets of experiment were the following:
Step 1: Subjects in the experiment were seated and told a lunch sitting in front of them,
consisting of the baseline beef sandwich, chips, dessert, and drink was "free." The participants
were also given $15 in cash at the beginning of the one-hour experiment.
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Step 2: Subjects were assigned an identification number to ensure anonymity of the data
they provided. Participants were infonned verbally and also provided with written instructions 5
that indicated they would be allowed to bid for what they would require to be paid to "switch"
their baseline sandwich for each of four alternative sandwiches. Subjects were told that for the
baseline sandwich "certified infonnation is available that the beef in this sandwich can be traced
back to the fann in the US where it originated and this beef has been inspected." The subjects
were given the following infonnation about the alternative sandwiches in the experiment:

Sandwich 1 - certified infonnation is available that the beef in this sandwich can be traced back
to the fann where it originated. The beef in the sandwich has also been inspected and imported
from Canada; Sandwich 2 - certified infonnation is available that the beef in this sandwich has
been inspected and that it was imported from Canada; Sandwich 3 - certified infonnation is
available that the beef in this sandwich has been inspected and that it originated in the USA; and

Sandwich 4 - certified infonnation is available that this sandwich has been inspected.
Step 3: Participants were infonned that they would be allowed to place anonymous bids
for what they would need to be paid to give up their baseline sandwich for each of the four
alternative sandwiches. To ensure that bids would be placed based only on the infonnation
provided, the sandwiches were constructed so that the baseline and the four alternatives looked
virtually identical. There is some discussion in the literature about whether nth -price auctions or
2nd -price (Vickery) auctions elicit more accurate results about consumer demand. Parkhurst,
Shogren, and Dickinson (2004) indicate that the average bids using either procedure should be
the same and a Vickery (second-price) auction is used in our experiments.

5The

written instruction is available from the authors on request.
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Step 4: After all questions had been answered, a trial auction using a baseline candy bar
and asking participants to provide anonymous bids regarding the appropriate discount or,
conversely, what they would need to be paid (WTA) to accept a different candy bar. The trial
was designed to give participants experience regarding how the actual auctions would operate.
There were two rounds of bidding for two candy bars. After both trials rounds were finished,
random numbers were drawn to select the "binding" round and "binding" candy bar. Money and
the candy were then exchanged for the binding candy bar.
After answering additional questions following the trial auction, written bids were taken
from each participant for Sandwich 1, then Sandwich 2, then Sandwich 3, and finally Sandwich
4. Six total rounds were completed in order for the bid amounts to stabilize (e.g., Hayes et al
(1995); Shogren et al. (2001); Dickinson and Bailey (2002) and (2003). The potential ''winner''
in any given round for any given sandwich was the person with the lowest bid. However, the
potential payoff to the winner was the 2nd lowest bid (Vickery auction style). The "winning" bid
for each sandwich (2nd lowest bid) was announced at the end of each round to provide
participants with "market" information. Each participant's bid was recorded by an assistant at
the end of each round so that data on every bid placed by each participant was preserved.
Step 5: Following the completion of all six rounds, a round was selected at random as the
binding round and a sandwich as the binding sandwich. This made the participant's every bid in
every round a potentially binding bid. Participants were fully aware before the auction rounds
commenced that this would be done. The person "winning" the randomly selected alternative
sandwich in the binding round was paid the winning amount and the binding alternative
sandwich was switched with the winner's baseline sandwich.
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Step 6: Participants were asked to complete a survey6 eliciting not only socioeconomic
information (age, gender education, income, etc.) about themselves and their family, but also
other information that might influence bids. For example, participants were asked how many
servings of beef they consumed each week, whether or not they made food purchasing decisions
in their home, and whether or not a family member had become sufficiently ill from a of a foodborne illness to require hospitalization.
Comparisons ofPre- and Post-BSE Participants

Table 1 presents the set of variables together with their descriptive statistics that were
developed from the auctions and the survey responses and used in the analysis. Participants in
both the pre- and post-BSE experimental auctions were also asked a battery of questions to
determine their knowledge of specific characteristics relating to the Canadian BSE case in May
2003 (e.g., province where BSE was found, number of infected animals found, when BSE was
found, etc.) and were also asked about their general knowledge of BSE as a disease (e.g., how
humans contract the disease, how BSE is diagnosed, etc.). A variable, BSECAN, was constructed
as the percentage of correct answers the participant gave about the Canadian BSE crisis. Another
variable, BSEKNOW, was constructed as the percentage of correct answers about BSE (Table 1).
Although individual participants in the pre- and post-BSE sets of experiments were not
identical, the same socioeconomic categories (faculty, students, professional employees, and
classified employees) were used. Table 2 presents comparisons of the socioeconomic
characteristics for the pre- and post-BSE groups. Table 2 reveals that only a few statistically
significant differences existed between the pre- and post-BSE participants. These differences
were that post-BSE participants were less likely to be married (MARRIED), less likely to do their

6The survey instrument is available from the authors on request.
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household's grocery shopping (SHOP), ate a greater percentage of their meals at home
(ATHOME), were less motivated by food safety concerns when purchasing meat (FSIMP), and

knew more about the Canadian BSE case than did pre-BSE participants (BSECAN) (Table 2).
Whether animal identification in the US should be a voluntary or mandatory program has
been a matter of discussion for some time but has become an especially important issue since
December 23 rd . We asked participants in the post-BSE auctions to indicate whether they
believed animal identification in the US should be voluntary or mandatory. Most participants
(69%) believe animal identification should be a mandatory program. Those believing animal
identification should be voluntary in the US were statistically more certain about the quality of
imported Canadian beef (TRUSTCAN), less likely to be in the medium income category
(MIDINC), and knew less about the Canadian BSE case (BSECAN), and BSE in general (BSE)

than did those desiring a mandatory program (Table 2).
Regression Analysis

Regression analysis was used to determine the participant characteristics, (age, gender,
income, education, knowledge about BSE, past illness, etc.) that affected average WTA. The
model's form was the following:
(1)

AVGBIDij =a o +aIFEMALEj +a 2 AGE j +a 3 MARRIEDj +a 4CHILDREN j +asSHOPj
a 6ATHOME% j + a 7ILLNESS j + asPRIMPj + a 9FSIMPj + a10TRUSTUS j + au TRUSTCAN j
+a 12 SOMECOL j +a 13 COLLEGE j +a I4 POSTGRAD j +alsMIDINC j +a I6 HIGHINC j
w
4

+a I7 BSECAN j +alsBSEKNOWj +a I9 BEFORE j + ~fJi-ISi +8ij
i=2

here variable names and descriptions are given in Table 1. The subscript "i" indicates the lh
sandwich type (i=I, 2, 3, 4) and the subscript ''j'' is for the jth participant (j= 1,2, 3, ... , 113).

12
Many of the variables in equation (1) are binary. The base regression was for WTA
Sandwich 4 (S4), the non-traceable beef of unknown origin, by participants with less than a
college education (SOMECOL), and in the lowest income category (LOW/NC). The parameter
estimate on BEFORE ( a 19 ) is a test for whether or not average WT A alternative sandwiches
changed after the US BSE case in December 2003. A significant negative value for BEFORE's
parameter would indicate that WTA increased following the US BSE case.
Results
Table 3 reports the average bids for WTA alternative sandwiches and an initial statistical
analysis for differences in WTA between pre- and post-BSE auctions. The results presented in
Table 3 indicate that WTA (S], S2, S3, and S4) is non-zero in all cases. This suggests that, on the
average, a non-zero amount would need to be paid to participants to entice them to substitute
their baseline sandwich for one of the alternative sandwiches. Average WTA was higher for S],
S2, and S3 in the post-BSE auctions than in the pre-BSE auctions. However, a comparison of pre-

and post-BSE coefficients of variation (Table 3) that variability in WTA increased for S], S2, and

S3 in the post-BSE than in the pre-BSE experiments. This provides evidence for increased
uncertainty regarding the value of certifications for traceability and country of origin after the US
BSE incident. This may help to explain why average bids to accept S4 declined as did the

variability of bids for S4 in the post-BSE auctions compared to the pre-BSE auctions. It is
probable that participants in the post-BSE experiments were simply less certain as a group about
the value of different certifications after December 23 rd than they were before December 23 rd .
WTA for S3, the sandwich providing US country-of-origin certification but not
traceability, was barely statistically different than zero at the 10% level in the post-BSE
experiments. A comparison of the pre- and post-BSE mean WTA the alternative sandwiches
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reveals that, statistically speaking, WTA increased in the post-BSE auctions only for S} (Pre S) Post S} in Table 3), the traceable Canadian beef sandwich. At the time the post-BSE auctions
were held, a public announcement had been made reporting that the BSE cow in the state of
Washington was of Canadian origin. The results suggest that for the participants in these
auctions the US BSE case likely hurt the reputation of Canadian beef more than it did US beef.
This is based on that fact that, as a group, post-BSE participants exhibited weaker WTA for
Canadian beef, even if it was traceable, than did pre-BSE participants.
Table 4 reports the parameter estimates for a random-effects model of average WTA
amounts required to entice participants to accept a non-baseline sandwich. The random effects
model follows Dickinson and Bailey (2002) and (2003) and was selected after the Lagrange
Multiplier (LM) and Hausman tests revealed that to be the appropriate estimation procedure
(Table 4) (Greene). The regression analysis was necessary to account for socioeconomic and
other participant characteristics that might affect participants' WTA the alternative sandwiches.
Because this is a WT A model, the interpretation of a positive (negative) coefficient is that
presence of that characteristic increases (decreases) what would need to be paid to the subj ect for
them to accept one of the alternative sandwiches as a substitute for the baseline sandwich.
Again, the baseline sandwich contains traceable, US beef.
The results in Table 4 indicate that there is no firm statistical evidence to indicate that the
WTA alternative sandwiches changed after the US BSE case (insignificant parameter estimate on

BEFORE). However, the relatively large coefficient and standard error of the parameter estimate
for BEFORE, implies a fair amount of variation in average WT A bids between pre- and post-

BSE participants (see Table 3) and supports the notion that uncertainty about WTA generally
increased after December 23 rd .
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The results reported in Table 4 also indicate that both traceability and country-of-origin
information (S)) (even if the meat is imported) or knowing the beef was produced domestically
(S3) were more acceptable to participants than simply knowing the meat was inspected (S4).

These results confrrm both Loureiro and Umberger's findings (2003) that country-of-origin
information is valuable to US consumers and Dickinson and Bailey's (2002) and (2003) findings
that traceability is a valuable market characteristic. This implies that even though the overall
reputation of Canadian beef has been damaged among our participants since the US ESE case
(Table 3), traceability makes Canadian beef more acceptable than ifit is non-traceable. This is
based on the insignificant parameter estimate for S2, the non-traceable Canadian beef, and the
significant, negative parameter estimate for S), the traceable Canadian beef.
Socioeconomic and other participant characteristic played a role in their WTA alternative
sandwiches. Participants eating most of their meals at home (ATHOME) required more money
to give up their baseline sandwich than did participants eating most of their meals away from
home, on the average. This might suggest that persons eating away from home expect vendors to
provide implicit assurances while those eating mostly at home have a greater sense of
responsibility about choosing the assurances they desire.
Persons with high degrees of trust in the US government inspections (TRUSTGOV) were
more likely to substitute their baseline sandwich freely among the alternative sandwiches than
were participants with less trust of US government inspection. This suggests that certifications
beyond simple government inspection (i.e., traceability and country of origin) are simply not as
important to this group as they were to people with less trust in the US government. Similarly,
the older the participant (AGE) the more willing he/she was to substitute the baseline sandwich
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for one of the alternative sandwiches. This suggests that traceability and country-or-origin
certifications were more important to younger participants than they were to older participants.
Participants with post-graduate education (POSTGRAD) needed to be paid more to
switch the baseline sandwich for one of the alternatives than participants with less education.
Income was not found to influence average WTA. Thompson (1998) notes similar results in his
study of WTP for organic food certifications when he suggests that income may not be related to
organic food purchases.
Knowledge of the Canadian BSE case (BSECAN) did not significantly affect WTA.
However, knowledge about BSE in general (BSEKNOW) had a positive effect on WTA. This
suggests that persons with above average knowledge about scientific matters concerning BSE
valued traceability and country of origin information more than participants with less knowledge
about BSE. This implies that educating people about BSE from a scientific perspective will
likely result in more support for traceability and country of origin programs.
A logistical regression was used to determine if any of the socioeconomic and other
characteristics indicated in equation (1) affected whether or not participants in the post-BSE
auctions supported voluntary or mandatory animal ill programs in the US 7 The logit analysis
indicated that none of the socioeconomic characteristics of participants, except for TR USTCAN,
influenced the probability of a participant favoring mandatory animal ill programs in the US.

TRUSTCAN increased the probability of a participant favoring mandatory ill. This is not
surprising because the Canadian animal ill system is mandatory and if a participant trusted the
Canadian system, they would likely favor a similar system in the US.

7

The full set of logistical regression results is available from the authors by request.
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The results suggest that support for mandatory ill among the participants is widespread
(69% of participants) and is not determined by demographic their characteristics. Given the
average WTA is non-zero, the results provide some evidence for a large number of US
consumers being willing to support the implementation of a mandatory animal ill program with
tax dollars. Of course, these results should be confirmed with a broader probability study.

Conclusions
A series of experimental auctions were conducted immediately preceding and following
the announcement on December 23,2003 that a cow in the state of Washington had been
diagnosed with BSE. The data set offers some unique insights into the effects of BSE on beef
demand in the US because it provides a snapshot of demand for a set of American consumers on
both sides of a major food safety event.
The results indicate that information about traceability and country of origin is valuable
to consumers. They also suggest that greater uncertainty about certifications and assurances for
beef existed among the participants after December 23 rd than before December 23 rd. While this
is not surprising, it indicates that US consumers, while not necessarily changing beef buying
habits, were subject to some "shock" to their overall perceptions about beef and certifications
and assurances about beef.
Perhaps one of the most important findings was that participants' demand for Canadian
beef was more adversely affected by the US BSE crisis than was the demand for US beef. This
implies that US consumers have placed at least some of the "blame" for the US BSE incident on
Canada because the subj ect animal was born there.
The results suggest that a large percentage of US consumers would support a mandatory
animal ill system in the US and would be willing to pay something for it. Additional work is

17
needed to confinn these results. However, they confinn that the US BSE case caused some
important changes in American consumer attitudes. Consequently, the US beef industry should
not assume that because no noticeable change in US consumer demand for beef occurred after
December 23,2003. Consumers are more uncertain about beef products than they were prior to
December 23 rd . Additional BSE cases could exacerbate this uncertainty. The movement toward
animal ill systems appears to be a good strategic move by the US beef industry and the US
government, based on participants' stated support for such systems.
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Table 1. Variable Names and Descriptions.
Variable
AVGBID
FEMALE
AGE
MARRIED
CHILDREN
SERVINGS
SHOP
A THOME
ILLNESS
PRIMP
FSIMP
TRUSTUS

TRUSTCAN

SOMECOL
COLLEGE
POSTGRAD
LOWINC
MIDINC
HIGHINC
BSECAN

Description
Average of bid for all six rounds for all sandwiches
Female =1,0 otherwise
Age of subject in years
Married = 1, 0 otherwise
Presence of children in household under 18 = 1, 0 otherwise
Number of times beef Eroducts are eaten each week.
Primary grocery shoEEer in household = 1, 0 otherwise
Over 50% of meals 2re2ared at home =1,0 otherwise
In past five years someone in household or immediate
family suffered from a food borne illness = 1, 0 otherwise
Ranked price as first or second (out of 6) most important
determinant of meat Eurchases = 1, 0 otherwise
Ranked "safety of meat" as first or second (out of 6) most
important determinant of meat purchases = 1, 0 otherwise
On a 5 point scale with 5 being "very good assurance" and 1
indicating "no assurance", rated "USDA inspection" as a 4
or above = 1, 0 otherwise
On a 5 point scale with 5 being "very good assurance" and 1
indicating "no assurance", rated "Imported from Canada" as
a 4 or above = 1, 0 otherwise
Less than a bachelors degree has been achieved = 1, 0
otherwise
Bachelors degree is the highest level of education achieved
= 1, 0 otherwise
Graduate degree is the highest level of education achieved
= 1, 0 otherwise
Household income is < $30,000 =1,0 otherwise
Household income is $30,000 - $59,999 =1, 0 otherwise
Household income is $60,000+ =1,0 otherwise
Score on a test about knowledge ofBSE incidence(s) in
U.S. and Canada (note: for experiments before outbreak in
U.S. questions dealt with the Canadian incidence.)

BSEKNOW
Sandwich 1
(S])

Score on test about scientific knowledge of BSE
Certified information is available that the beef in this
sandwich can be traced back to the farm where is originated
and has been inspected and imported from Canada=l, 0
otherwise

Sandwich 2
(S2)

Certified information is available that the beef in this
sandwich has been inspected and imported from Canada= 1,
o otherwise

Sandwich 3
(S3)

Certified information is available that the beef in this
sandwich has been inspected and that it originated in the
U.S.=I, 0 otherwise

Sandwich 4
(S4)
ANIMID

Certified information is available that the beef in this
sandwich has been inspected = 1, 0 otherwise
Animal ID system should be mandatory = 1, voluntary =0
(note: only asked for groups after BSE in U.S.)

BEFORE

Subject from experiment before BSE outbreak in U.S.=I, 0
otherwise

Mean
2.479
49.6%
35.319
72.3%
43.4%
3.058
62.2%
92.0%
33.0%

Std.Dev.
8.236
50.1%
11.593
44.8%
49.6%
1.810
48.6%
27.1%
47.1%

50.5%

50.1%

45.0%

49.8%

82.1%

38.3%

20.5%

40.4%

33.6%

47.3%

31.9%

46.6%

34.5%

47.6%

40.2%
33.0%
26.8%
43.5%

49.1%
47.1%
44.3%
27.0%

55.6%

27.2%

69.1%

46.3%

51.3%

50.0%
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Table 2. Overall Means for Variables Included in the Study Together with Tests for
Significant Differences (10 % Level of Significance) Between Pre- and Post-BSE
Experimental Groups and Between Participants in Favor of a Voluntary or Mandatory
AnimalID System in the US.
Variable

Mean

FEMALE

49.6%

Change after BSE
in U.S. a

n/c C
n/c

Mean for Mandatory
vs. voluntary b

n/c
n/c
n/c
n/c
n/c
n/c
n/c
n/c
n/c
n/c
n/c

AGE
35.319
72.3%
MARRIED
43.4%
CHILDREN
n/c
SERVINGS
305.8%
n/c
SHOP
62.2%
92.0%
A THOME
n/c
ILLNESS
33.0%
n/c
50.5%
PRIMP
n/c
45.0%
FSIMP
82.1%
TRUSTUS
n/c
TRUSTCAN
20.5%
n/c
33.6%
HIGHSCHOOL
n/c
n/c
COLLEGE
31.9%
n/c
n/c
34.5%
POSTGRAD
n/c
n/c
LOWINC
40.2%
n/c
n/c
MIDINC
33.0%
n/c
n/c
HIGHINC
26.8%
n/c
n/c
BSECAN
43.5%
+
+
BSEKNOW
55.6%
n/c
+
a + (_) indicates significant increase (decrease) in means for subjects after the BSE incidence in
the U.S.
b + (_) indicates significant higher (lower) means for subj ects favoring mandatory animal ill
systems. It should be noted that only subjects after the BSE incidence in the U.S. were asked
this question.
C n/c indicates no significant change in means of two groups.
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Table 3. WTA Average Bids and Statistical Comparisons for Pre- and Post-BSE Auctions.
Variable(s)
Mean
Standard
Coefficient
t-statistic
Deviation
of Variation
Combined Experiments:

S]
S2
S3
S4

$1.48
$3.07
$l.86
$3.50

2.740
10.873
8.455
8.550

185%
354%
455%
244%

5.743***
3.000***
2.349**
4.356***

$l.12
$l.89
$l.12
$3.92

l.902
4.000
2.860
1l.216

170%
212%
255%
286%

4.503***
3.611 ***
2.970***
2.665***

$l.86
$4.30
$2.65
$3.06

3.388
15.011
1l.764
4.295

182%
349%
444%
140%

4.064***
2.126**
l.673*
5.284***

N=113
Pre-BSE Experiments:

S]
S2
S3
S4
N=58
Post-BSE Experiments:

S]
S2
S3
S4
N=55
Comparisons Pre- and
Post-BSE:
Pre S] - Post S]
Pre S2 - Post S2
Pre S3 - Post S3
Pre S3 - Post S4

Prob of> ta
0.082
0.124
0.175
0.293

*** Denotes statistically different than zero at the 1% level.
** Denotes statistically different than zero at the 5% level.
* Denotes statistically different than zero at the 1% level.
a One-tailed t-test of significance.
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Table 4. Random Effects Estimation Results (Dependent Variable = Subject's Average
Subject Bid Over Six Auction Rounds).
Variable
Lagrange multiplier test
Hausman test
R2
Number of observations

Constant
FEMALE
AGE
MARRIED
CHILDREN
SERVINGS
SHOP
A THOME
ILLNESS
PRIMP
FSIMP
TRUSTUS
TRUSTCAN
Education b
COLLEGE
POSTGRAD
Income C

Coefficient a

Standard Error

31.96***
30.45
.095
452
12.121
0.573
-0.182
-0.004
2.820
0.169
0.003
-7.455
0.005
-0.133
0.130
0.000
0.000

***
***
***

***

2.504
1.048
0.045
0.004
0.986
0.234
0.003
1.650
0.004
0.557
0.557
0.005
0.004

0.953
2.981 **

1.153
1.293

MIDINC
HIGHINC
BSECAN
BSEKNOW
Meat Characteristics d

-0.980
0.978
-2.800
5.391 ***

0.635
0.635
1.980
1.683

Sandwich 1 (S1)

-2.022 **

0.954

Sandwich 2 (S2)

-0.436

0.954

Sandwich 3 (S3)

-1.639 *
-0.884

0.954
0.836

BEFORE
a ***=.01

significance, **=.05 significance and *=.10 significance.
Base is high school highest education degree.
C Base is low income (household income < $30,000).
d Base is sandwich 4 (S4=meat has been inspected).

b
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